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R. J. Chambers on Securities and Obscurities: 
Making a Case for the Reform of the Law of Company Accounts in the 1970s 
 
Abstract:  
This study examines the contribution of Raymond J. Chambers to the British inflation accounting 
debate in the early-to-mid 1970s, from the perspective of the reception of his book, Securities 
and Obscurities: A Case for Reform of the Law of Company Accounts, published in 1973. To 
structure the empirical narrative, drawing on previously unpublished documents from the R. J. 
Chambers Archives, we employ Czarniawska and Joerges’ (1996) notion of the ‘travel of ideas’, 
and Mumford’s (1979) observation of the existence of ‘inflation accounting debate cycles’. The 
result is a narrative that traces the environmental and material circumstances that led to 
Chambers’ book having a lesser impact on the British inflation debate than one would expect 
based on his influence at the time and the empirical rigor of his proposal. The purpose of this 
exercise is to assess how contextual factors, such as the choice of publisher, use of promotional 
material, and distribution methods, can be as (or more) important than the substance of the 
proposed ideas, arguments, and solutions. 
 
Keywords: Accounting cycles; Inflation; R. J. Chambers; Securities and Obscurities; Travel of 
ideas 
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R. J. Chambers on Securities and Obscurities: 
Making a Case for the Reform of the Law of Company Accounts in the 1970s 
 
The fact that [Raymond J. Chambers] has apparently had much less impact on the practical 
developments of the last decade than his competitors stands as a warning that we should not 
view practical developments merely as the outcome of an academic debate: ideas are well-
received when the environment is favourable to them, not merely when they find an eloquent 
advocate (Tweedie and Whittington, 1984, p. 191). 
 
The Australian academic Raymond J. Chambers (1917–1999) is one of the most divisive, 
influential, and persuasive accounting theorists of our time (for more about Chambers and his 
contribution to accounting thought, see Zeff, 1982a; Gaffikin, 1994; Al-Hogail and Previts, 
2001; Colasse, 2005). While his academic interests were broad, Chambers spent much of his 
energy developing accounting theory, measurements, the usefulness of its information, and 
tackling the problems caused by changing (general and specific) prices. Chambers’ most 
productive years began in the 1950s and lasted through the 1970s, and he published widely 
during the inflation accounting debate, which took place in most English speaking countries from 
the early to the mid-1970s. However, and despite his efforts, Chambers’ influence on the British 
debate remained small. 
To understand this apparent contradiction between Chambers’ prominence and his limited 
influence over the British inflation accounting debate, we start from Tweedie and Whittington’s 
(1984b) claims about the importance of a ‘favorable environment’ as a crucial component in the 
explanation of the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of ideas to spread and be picked up in intellectual 
debates. This insight prompted us to investigate the effects that environmental and material 
circumstances had on Chambers’ primary contribution during the British debate, Securities and 
Obscurities: A Case for Reform of the Law of Company Accounts, which was published in 1973. 
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With a focus on Chambers’ primary contribution, the investigation does not extend to all of 
his activities during the inflation debate in the 1970s. As a prodigious writer and iconoclast, 
Chambers gave over 140 lectures, published over 100 articles, and made over 30 submissions to 
professional bodies during this period alone.1 Furthermore, whereas these activities took place 
almost exclusively outside of the United Kingdom (UK), Chambers did publish a series of 
articles in the British practitioner journal The Accountant and submit one set of comments to the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) during this period. The 
empirical narrative addresses this material but only insofar that it relates to the events 
surrounding the publication, distribution, and reception of Securities and Obscurities (hereafter 
S&O). 
To develop the empirical narrative, we draw on over 150 previously unpublished documents 
from the R. J. Chambers Archive, located at the University of Sydney. One of the authors 
(Persson) collected this material during a visit in September 2012. The entire archive contains 
over 15,000 letters of Chambers’ correspondence as well as his personal collection of books, 
manuscript, and memorabilia (for more information about the archive, see Dean, et al., 2006).2 
To structure the narrative, we employ Czarniawska and Joerges’ (1996) notion of the ‘travel of 
ideas’ and Mumford’s (1979) hypothesis that there are general patterns of ‘inflation accounting 
debate cycles’. 
The problem of how to account for the financial effects of specific and general price changes 
(i.e. inflation) has received considerable attention in the accounting literature. Chambers (e.g., 
1949; 1952a; 1952b; 1965; 1973c; 1975) and other prominent academics (e.g., Schmidt, 1921; 
                                                 
1 These totals were obtained using the ‘Aide Memoire’ in the appendix of Chambers on Accounting: Logic, Law and 
Ethics (Chambers and Dean, 2000) and matching those entries with the dates given in appendix one. 
2 Abstracts of Chambers' 15,000 letters can be accessed online at http://sydney.edu.au/business/chambers/archive. 
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Sweeney, 1936; May, 1949; Baxter, 1975) have published widely on the subject and the result 
has been a number of proposals to change the way in which accounts are prepared. During the 
inflationary period of the 1970s, several of these proposals were also evaluated for 
implementation on behest of various government inquiries, chaired by Russell Mathews (1975), 
Francis Sandilands (1975), and Ivor Richardson (1976). The goal of these inquiries was to select 
a ‘good’ method of accounting for changes in general price-levels, whereas several authors were 
also interested in accounting for changes in specific prices (e.g., a change in the price of a 
particular asset due to a change in supply and demand). These committees chose accounting 
methods combining current exit prices (i.e. fair value), current entry prices (replacement 
cost/price), and modified dated entry prices (historical cost) using an index to track the change in 
general price-levels over time. 
Whereas such proposals to modify accounting have lapsed, contemporary academics have 
begun revisiting the work of these committees and the general debate around inflation 
accounting in English-speaking countries (e.g., Whittington, 1983; Robson, 1994a; Whittington, 
2007a) and in particular those in the UK (e.g., Westwick, 1980; Robson, 1988; 1994b). Inflation 
and measurement problems more broadly has also been a re-occurring theme in Abacus (e.g., 
Chambers, 1966b; Clarke, 1980; 2000), the journal that Chambers founded (for more about the 
founding of the journal, see Wells, 2000). The most recent examples of this ongoing interest in 
the literature are two special issues of Abacus (2010) and Accounting & Business Research 
(2007) on accounting measurement. 
In contrast to the research in the 1970s that proposed and evaluated the merits of various 
inflation accounting proposals, and the later research that has focused on the ensuing intellectual 
debates, our empirical narrative emphasizes the environmental and material circumstances in 
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which ‘accounting solutions’ for inflation are communicated with the view to influence practice. 
We use the publication, distribution, and reception of S&O during the British debate on inflation 
accounting in the early-to-mid 1970s as an example of such communication. 
This approach is necessarily partial, as we do not consider all competing solutions such as 
accounting based on cash flows, purchasing power, and current, historical, and replacement cost 
(for more about these competing proposals, see chapters 7–12 in the report of the Sandilands 
Committee, 1975).3 This partial approach, however, is consistent with Qu, et al. (2010) and the 
emerging socio-historical literature on knowledge production and dissemination, which tends to 
focus on particular proposals as opposed to the wider field of competing ideas (e.g., Persson, 
2013; Persson and Napier, 2014; Persson, et al., 2017). It also stands in contrast to traditional 
approaches to the study of ideas that draw on citation analysis (e.g., Bricker, 1988; Beattie and 




We employ two analytical tools to frame our narrative, viz. Czarniawska & Joerges’ (1996) 
notion of the ‘travel of ideas’ and Mumford’s (1979) hypothesis that there are general patterns of 
‘inflation accounting debate cycles’. The purpose of these two analytical tools is to trace and 
situate the materialization and dissemination of Chambers’ ideas in S&O through the 
environmental and material circumstances at the time. 
The diffusion of Chambers’ ideas in S&O is suitable for this kind of analysis for at least three 
reasons. First, he was one of the most prominent authorities on the subject of accounting 
                                                 
3 See Clarke (1982) for a more comprehensive overview of these accounting methods. 
 7 
measurements in general, and changing price-levels in particular, during the 1960s and early-to-
mid 1970s. S&O, in particular, was published during this debate and contained an exceptional 
amount of empirical evidence in favor of accounting reform. Although Chambers (1973b, p. 156) 
maintained that his proposal for reform had universal applicability, the book had a British 
distributor, a majority evidence came from incidents at British companies, and it contained a 
redraft of Schedule Eight of the British Companies Act 1948 for the potential adoption by 
parliament. If adopted, it would have made his method to account for both general and specific 
price changes a legal requirement for public companies in the UK.4 Given these factors, one 
would expect his ideas to have had a considerable impact on the inflation debate in this country. 
Further, the R. J. Chambers Archive contains substantial correspondence detailing the 
circumstances surrounding the process of writing and publishing S&O. This correspondence 
reveals circumstantial information about the choice of publisher, promotional material, and 
distribution methods, which is normally not accessible to the researcher and therefore excluded 
from most narratives. Third, and related to this, for Chambers to influence the British inflation 
accounting debate through S&O, his ideas had to travel from his home institution, the University 
of Sydney, in Australia, to the UK. This ‘traveling of ideas’ has left a trail of empirical evidence 
that is now accessible to the researcher. 
Our first analytical tool comes from Czarniawska and Joerges’ (1996) notion of the ‘travel of 
ideas’. This research is situated in the studies of science and technology literature (for a review 
of the literature, see Sismondo, 2003). It seeks to understand why certain ideas spread and 
sustain through time, whereas others wither. The basic proposition is that ideas have no inherent 
qualities that distinguish the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’. Ideas are instead more like images that 
                                                 
4 While reference in S&O is to Schedule Eight of the British Companies Act 1948, this was also used as an exemplar 
for all countries adopting British company law such as Australia (Schedule Nine), New Zealand, and Sri Lanka. 
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materialize into objects through recording, painting, or writing. Thus, the spread and sustenance 
of these images does not depend on some inherent qualities but on success in communication and 
representation. Insights such as these have led Qu et al. (2010) to examine the process of 
promoting and implanting the balanced scorecard; Napier (2011) to consider the role of the 
London School of Economics in advancing a particular set of ideas; and Persson and Napier 
(2014) to trace ideas circulating in ‘networks of accounting research’ in the 1950s. 
If ideas possess no inherent qualities, the loci of the analysis become the process, place, and 
time in which these ideas materialize, disseminate, and, on occasion, become permanent fixtures 
that sustain through time. Groups and individuals become important subjects in an analysis of 
this kind. These subjects are constrained by physical, cultural, and political barriers that lead 
them to ‘discover’, intentionally and unintentionally, different things in similar ideas. 
Furthermore, because these groups and individuals are limited to what they can and want to 
notice, repeated exposure to ideas becomes crucial to their adoption. This is particularly so for 
novel ideas, such as Chambers’ solution to the problem of changing prices and price-levels, as 
these require the rearranging of existing beliefs before reaching acceptance. Consistent with 
Tweedie and Whittington’s (1984b) observation in the introduction, Donaghue (2008) expressed 
the relationship between ideas and repetition as: 
 
So long as the idea keeps “touching down” repetitively in the consciousness of groups or 
individuals, then it has the ability to become an action at some point in time. Such a process 
does not rely on logic and rationality, but on a convergence of favourable circumstances, and 
to a degree, luck (p. 24). 
 
Our second analytical tool is Mumford’s (1979) hypothesis that there are general patterns of 
‘inflation accounting debate cycles’. The hypothesis based on an examination of the British 
inflation accounting debates in the 1950s and the mid-to-early 1970s. Burrows and Rowles 
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(2010) have subsequently observed the same general patterns of inflation debates in Australia, 
and Nobes (1991; 1992b) has made similar discoveries in regards to British accounting standard 
setting (for more about the debate surrounding these findings, see Nobes, 1992a; Skerratt and 
Whittington, 1992). Our empirical narrative, however, is focused solely on S&O and the British 
inflation accounting debate in the mid-to-early 1970s. As such, we do not aim to offerany insight 
into the reoccurrence of particular ideas in different periods of inflation or the general application 
of ‘inflation accounting debate cycles’ to all inflation episodes (for a more comprehensive 
treatment of different periods and proposals, see Whittington, 1983; Tweedie and Whittington, 
1984a; Whittington, 2007b).  
Although the stages in Mumford’s (1979) cycles overlap, he observes that inflation 
accounting debates tend to contain some elements of an eight-stage pattern: 
 
1. Increase in domestic inflation 
2. Reaction by the accounting profession 
3. Intervention by government 
4. Radical studies of accounting techniques 
5. Controversy in the profession 
6. Compromise recommendation 
7. Reduction in domestic inflation 
8. Interest in reform dwindles 
 
This insight is used to structure the narrative in regards to time, and to highlight that there was 
a ‘window of opportunity’ in which Chambers’ ‘traveling ideas’ would have had the greatest 
chance of repeated exposure and adoption. Mumford (1979) informs us that this window starts 
with an increase in domestic inflation (stage one) and ends with the formulation of a compromise 
that conforms to preexisting beliefs (stage six). Stages two, three, four, and five can and do occur 
simultaneously, but only those ideas that arrive before the ‘compromise recommendation’ stage 
can receive due consideration. In the context of the British inflation accounting debate from the 
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late 1960s to mid-1970s, this window would have stretched from the onset of inflation to the 
Accounting Standards Committee’s issuance of Exposure Draft No. 18 (ED18) in November 
1976 (for more about these events, see Tweedie and Whittington, 1984b; Pong and Whittington, 
1996; Burrows and Rowles, 2010). This exposure draft marked the last radical study of 
accounting techniques before the search for a compromise recommendation and a reduction in 
domestic inflation in the mid-to-late 1970s (for a timeline of these events, see appendix one). 
After a summary of Chambers’ proposal to reform ‘company accounts’ in S&O, the empirical 
narrative traces how these ideas traveled from Australia to the UK and how, upon arrival, they 
failed to change the outcome of the inflation accounting debate. Our central argument is that this 
was so not because of some inherent flaws in Chambers’ proposal but because of specific 
environmental and material circumstances. We trace these circumstances over two sections. The 
first traces Chambers’ labor to transform his ideas into an object that is able to travel. The second 
section traces how ill-advised choices in the materialization process led to a delay and eventual 
failure to disseminate Chambers’ proposal during the British inflation accounting debate. Our 
general observation is that groups and individuals participating in the inflation accounting debate 
were able to brush S&O aside because it arrived too late in the ‘inflation accounting debate 
cycles’ to warrant serious consideration. 
 
MAKING A CASE FOR REFORM OF THE LAW OF COMPANY ACCOUNTS 
 
Chambers had been collecting evidence of corporate oddities, mismanagement, accounting 
misrepresentations, and fraud since entering academia in the mid-1940s as a Lecturer at Sydney 
Technical College, where he had found the need to develop much of his own course material 
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(Clarke, et al., 2010). This habit had continued after his appointment as a Senior Lecturer at the 
University of Sydney in 1953. Archive correspondence reveals the purchase of many books from 
the UK in the 1950s, and Chambers would often arrange to collect further material when visiting 
abroad, such as his meeting in 1959 with Ronald Max Hartwell, an economic historian at Oxford 
University, to discuss the development of accounting methods over the last two centuries 
(#1/00078; #00331; #00564).5 Examining the accumulation of material eventually used as the 
empirical basis for S&O, we observe that Chambers made a staggering 348 references to various 
incidents at 278 different companies. A majority of these incidents (41%) and companies 
(36.5%) were British, with the remaining companies predominantly from the United States (US) 
and Australia (for a complete list of the empirical material, see appendix two).  
Excluding the work that was emerging from the Universities of Chicago and Rochester under 
the umbrella of ‘capital markets research’ (e.g., see Chambers, 1993), the amount of empirical 
observations contained in S&O would have been unprecedented in the accounting literature at 
the time of its publication. In fact, it is likely that the amount of empirical evidence amassed in 
favor of a particular accounting method remains unmatched to this day. It also far exceeded the 
amount of similar empirical material reproduced in various government inquiries on inflation 
accounting, such as the Mathews (1975), Sandilands (1975), and Richardson (1976) Committees. 
Despite of this considerable accomplishment, Chambers maintained in the introduction that 
‘[t]he examples cited in the book are only a fraction of what could have been tendered … but 
[that] enough is enough (p. viii)’. 
In addition to his collection of empirical evidence, Chambers had been on the forefront of 
inflation accounting debates in Australia in the 1950s (e.g., 1949; 1952a; 1952b). In 1966, he had 
                                                 
5 Letters from R. J. Chambers Archive, University of Sydney, Australia. Using the search function in the online 
archive, the digital object identifier (DOI) can be used to find the corresponding letter(s). The DOI number will be 
given for each subsequent reference to letters contained in this archive. 
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also published the full exposition of his accounting system, which was available internationally 
and addressed both general and specific price changes, in Accounting, Evaluation and Economic 
Behavior (AE&EB). Some of his critics, however, maintained that Chambers had not presented 
enough empirical evidence in AE&EB to support his system (e.g., see Leftwich, 1969, pp. 228–
236). With the rise of inflation in the late 1960s (see appendix one), he therefore saw an 
opportunity to reproduce the empirical evidence that had underpinned his writing of AE&EB but 
which had not formed a substantive part of the book.6 Chambers (1973b, p. 174) later made this 
point, stating that one of the aims of S&O was to counter the ‘impression’ that AE&EB was not 
based on empirical observation since he had not ventured to ‘parade the evidence’ in his initial 
full exposition of the system. 
It is worth noting that the examination of the empirical basis for S&O substantiates 
Chambers’ later claims, with half of the references being to incidents that occurred before 1966. 
In fact, the oldest reference goes as far back as an incident at London & General Bank in 1895. 
Further corroboration of this claim is also found in Chambers’ 1971 application for a D.Sc. in 
Economics degree from the University of Sydney, in which he states that he has spent the last 
few years collecting empirical evidence that was being prepared for an upcoming book (i.e. 
S&O). 
The accumulation of empirical material, the rise of inflation, and the criticism of AE&EB 
were all factors that spurred Chambers’ decision to write S&O. Chambers’ goal was to make ‘a 
case for reform of the law of company accounts’, which is also the subtitle given to the book. If 
adopted, the result of these reforms would have been an accounting system along the lines 
                                                 
6 Chambers wrote a response to Leftwich’s review monograph, but it remained unpublished until its inclusion in a 
collection of his writings (see pp. 137–145 in Chambers and Dean, 1986). Chambers (1974), on the other hand, was 
written and published as a response to a rather toxic review of S&O by Anderson and Leftwich (1974) in the Journal 
of Accounting Research. The archive contains the related correspondence between the authors (1/09284; #09290; 
#2/09291; #3/09854; 09855). 
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proposed in AE&EB, which would account for changes in both specific and general price-levels. 
The purpose of the amassed empirical material was therefore to demonstrate the need for such 
reform. Chambers stated his case in the preface: 
 
One thing common to all the companies mentioned is that the financial information they 
published was seriously deficient in quality. This book strikes at that common element … the 
book shows that the existing practices, even of companies that are well esteemed, are 
inadequate, uninformative and often obscurantist. The trouble has been that the laws, 
regulations and rules have been vague, toothless and often self-contradictory (p. ix). 
 
Chambers spread his empirical evidence over fifteen chapters. They built-up to the sixteenth and 
final chapter, ‘In the Public Interest and for the Protection of Investors’, in which he presented a 
redraft of Schedule Eight of the British Companies Act 1948 (its modern descendent is the 
Companies Act 2006). This schedule underpinned financial reporting in the UK and emphasized 
that accounts prepared for financial statements should depict a ‘true and fair view’ of company 
affairs’, but in a later article Chambers (1973b) clarified that he could not imagine a ‘… reason 
for believing that similar evidence would not be found in other countries which follow similar 
accounting practices (p. 156)’. 
Whereas Schedule Eight was silent on the measurement method that should be used to 
prepare such accounts, Chambers introduced a series of auxiliary statements in his redraft which 
specified measurements based on current exit prices.7 Considered in conjunction with the 
preceding fifteen chapters covering financial reporting deficiencies, it is our view that these 
auxiliary statements appeared so compelling that it is likely that a large portion of readers would 
have found them almost self-evident if accounts were to be produced in accordance with a ‘true 
                                                 
7 Current exit price accounting is sometimes incorrectly described as the forerunner of fair value accounting. 
Chambers’ accounting system diverts from contemporary thinking on fair value accounting on some issues. For 
example, Chambers did not wish to assign current exit prices to assets without active markets, something that is 
being done in fair value accounting either through proxies (level 2 fair value) or simulation (level 3 fair value). For 
more about this, see Dean’s (2007) editorial in Abacus. 
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and fair view’.8 As Chambers notes in his D.Sc. in Economics application mentioned above, 
there would also have been some precedence for his interpretation of a ‘true and fair view’, as 
directors of British companies had been obligated to report the difference between the historical 
cost and market value of properties under the Companies Act since 1967. 
Returning to the preface of S&O, Chambers wrote that ‘[t]he remedy seems to lie in the hands 
of the legislators. This book, however, provides evidence of the necessity and direction of 
reform, no matter who, in the upshot, brings it about (p. x)’. Accordingly, we argue that 
Chambers’ ambition with the publication of the book was much broader than to influence British 
legislators to adopt his redraft of Schedule Eight of the British Companies Act 1948. To 
appreciate this, one has to consider that Chambers had been on the forefront of accounting 
reform since entering academia in the 1940s. He had published widely in both academic and 
practitioner journals in the UK, US, and Australia. He had also written his earlier major work, 
AE&EB, in an attempt to convince the academic community about the merits of his accounting 
system. And, in addition to his publications, he had made several visits abroad. Most notably of 
these was a visit to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in an attempt to sway 
the opinions of those individuals working on the postulates and principles research program in 
the 1960s (for more about these events, see Zeff, 1982b; Persson and Napier, 2015; Persson, et 
al., 2015). 
Yet, these efforts had yielded little results in terms of substantive financial reporting reform. 
Chambers’ ideas had often been ignored, misunderstood, or misconstrued in the materialization, 
travel, and dissemination process. Chambers’ attempt to make ‘a case for reform of the law of 
company accounts’ to British legislators was therefore a part of a broader effort to circumvent 
                                                 
8 This is a testimony to the strength of the argument presented in S&O. Johnston (1978), for instance, investigated 
the same act and arrived at the opposite conclusion. According to him, current exit prices are incompatible with even 
the widest interpretation of a ‘true and fair view’ of company affairs’ as defined in the Companies Act. 
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academics, practitioners, and standard setters who had proved unreceptive to his ideas. As such, 
we do not interpret the inclusion of a redraft of Schedule Eight of the British Companies Act 
1948 as a sign that he was solely interested in influencing the British inflation accounting debate. 
Instead, we view S&O as an attempt to address the root problem, Schedule Eight, which was the 
same schedule that underpinned Schedule Nine of Australia’s Uniform Companies Act and 
similar legislation in other commonwealth countries (for more about this, see Anderson, 1998). 
In other words, S&O represented a different angle of attack, exposed to a British audience during 
an opportune time of inflation accounting debate, but with the aim of reforming accounting 
standards more widely to account for changes in both general and specific price-levels. 
Returning to the literature on the ‘travel of ideas’, we observe that S&O contained at least two 
elements that would, under normal circumstances, make for a successful and sustainable idea. 
First, Chambers was addressing recurring problems in financial reporting. The 348 observations 
in S&O spanned almost two-hundred years, up to the most current from 1972 (again, see 
appendix two for more about this). Second, Chambers was drawing on material that was likely to 
be familiar to his audience and therefore did not require them to rearrange their existing beliefs. 
This is evident in the careful selection of notorious cases, such as the overstated profits at 
Mineral Securities Australia (p. 189), Pergamon Press in the UK (pp. 192–193), and Westec 
Corporation in the US (pp. 191–192). It is also evident in Chambers’ heavy use of block-quotes 
from various authorities on financial reporting matters who appear to express views that are 
consistent with the idea that up-to-date exit prices are necessary to give a ‘true and fair view of 
company affairs’. Yet, and despite of these considerable merits, the following two sections 
demonstrate that there were environmental and material circumstances that prevented S&O from 
having the kind of impact that Chambers would have hoped. 
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MATERIALIZATION: FROM IDEAS TO SECURITIES AND OBSCURITIES 
 
Finding a Publisher 
Chambers began pursuing publishers in March 1971. The materialization of his ideas had then 
been underway for some time prior, and so too had British inflation which had been on the rise 
since 1968 (first stage of the inflation accounting cycle). There were draft chapters of two-thirds 
of S&O already written. Chambers’ goal was to have the publication coincide with the 
International Congress of Accountants held in May 1972 (#2/09216). This event would bring 
international academics to Sydney, Australia, and would therefore have been an ideal occasion 
for the spreading of his ideas abroad. The first choice of publisher had been Penguin Books, a 
prominent British publishing house that had been releasing accounting books in paperback as 
part of its ‘Pelican Library of Business and Management’ and ‘Penguin Modern Management 
Readings’ series (e.g., Carsberg and Edey, 1969; Sizer, 1969; Parker, 1972). 
Had Chambers been able to secure Penguin Books as his publisher, it is likely that S&O 
would have been much more widely disseminated. Chambers had sent S&O to the Australian 
Chief Editor, who had been cautiously optimistic about publishing it and passed it on to an 
external reader for review. The Editor had ensured that this external reader was a professional 
accountant with ‘deep interest’ in the subject matter of accounting, mismanagement, fraud, and 
failure. Unfortunately, whereas the Editor felt that S&O was written in the kind of prose that 
could appeal to a large market of ‘learned laymen’, the external reader disagreed and was not 
convinced that it could sell enough copies within a reasonable timeframe to warrant publication 
(#2/09217). To give an idea of what this meant, the required sales target for books published in 
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the ‘Pelican Library of Business and Management’ or ‘Penguin Modern Management Readings’ 
series were both 10,000 copies at the time. 
Unable to accept S&O for publication, the Editor directed Chambers to Cheshire Publishing 
(hereafter Cheshire) as a potential alternative. Cheshire was a small publishing house in 
Melbourne. It was a subsidiary of Xerox Education Group, located in the US, and it had an 
international distribution arm, Gower Press (hereafter Gower), located in the UK. Furthermore, 
like Penguin Books, it too was investing in educational books sold as paperbacks. Chambers 
found both the aspect of the international distribution arm and the paperback format appealing, 
as S&O would need both a wide presence and an affordable format to ensure a large circulation 
as possible among individuals participating in the inflation accounting debate. Accordingly, 
Chambers assigned the publishing rights to Cheshire and the distribution rights to Gower 
(#2/09217; #92218). 
 
From Manuscript to Book 
Chambers sent a finished draft of S&O to the Editor at Cheshire, Jackie Yowell, shortly after the 
conclusion of the contractual arrangements. Unfortunately, she did not return the draft until 
October 1972, which meant that Chambers had missed the opportunity to publish the book 
during the International Congress of Accountants. Nonetheless, cognizant of his desire to publish 
S&O within the ‘window of opportunity’ provided by the ongoing inflation accounting debate, 
she assured Chambers that a quick turnaround of the editorial comments would minimize further 
delays (#2/09219). 
Yowell’s editorial comments were mostly in regards to style and presentation, something she 
attributed to her lack of formal training in accounting. Similar to the Australian Chief Editor at 
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Penguin Books, she had found the prose cogent, interesting, and well composed. What was 
missing, she insisted, was a full bibliography of the material covered in S&O. She had also taken 
objection to Chambers’ proposed title, ‘A Case for Reform in the Law of Company Accounts’, 
which she feared was not ‘imaginative’ enough to grab the attention of potential readers. Her 
suggestion was to turn this into a subtitle, and in its place use something ‘punchy’ such as ‘The 
Gross Net’, ‘The Figure Benders’, ‘A True and Fair View’, or ‘Securities and Obscurities’ 
(#2/09219; #3/09836). 
Chambers turned the first half of the editorial comments around within the same month. He 
had decided against using most of Yowell’s suggestions and in so doing left most of the first 
draft of S&O intact. The exception to this was the inclusion of a full bibliography and the change 
of title. Chambers had initially not wanted to clutter the book with citations commonly known by 
his readership, but he now agreed that the inclusion of a full bibliography could only strengthen 
his case. Chambers and Yowell both seemed to have struggled with the linking of directors, 
investors, lawyers, accountants, and regulators in the title without making it unnecessarily long 
and obscure. Yet, a good first impression was important to catch those readers that might just be 
strolling through the bookstore. After some deliberation, Chambers had found the ‘The Gross 
Net’ too subtle, ‘The Figure Benders’ too offensive, and ‘A True and Fair View’ too ‘English’. 
He therefore settled on ‘Securities and Obscurities’, which he believed would appeal to his 
current readership, although it had a ring to it that was not to his taste (#2/09219).9 
Chambers did not turn around the second half of the editorial comments until December 1972. 
This delay was due to outstanding decisions regarding typesetting and the retrieval of copyright 
                                                 
9 Although Chambers’ does not elaborate on the matter in his letters, his readership at this time would have been 
broad. Chambers had already published widely and his journal, Abacus, had print runs of over 800 copies, twice a 
year, by 1969 (Wells, 2000). To put this into context, such numbers made Abacus the third most widely circulated 
academic accounting journal at the time, after The Accounting Review and the Journal of Accounting Research. 
Further, persons and libraries in more than forty countries subscribed to it. 
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permissions. The latter, in particular, had proved troublesome. Yowell had urged him to seek 
permission from the copyright holders of the extensive block-quotes used throughout S&O. Her 
experience was that this tended to give a more positive result than if Cheshire, a rival publisher, 
approached the rights holders directly (#2/09219). Chambers had agreed, but the process of 
reaching out to various publishers, primarily located in London, and a librarian at the ICAEW, 
who helped him chase down references of material he had consulted while visiting the Chartered 
Accountants’ Hall in 1959, proved a slow process (#2/09220; #09221). 
 
Publication and ‘Material’ Concerns 
Cheshire did not publish S&O until March 1973, which meant that the slow turnaround of the 
initial draft, the search for complete references, and the retrieval of copyright permission had 
delayed the publication of S&O for two years since the completion of the initial draft. Chambers 
expressed his disappointment about this delay to Yowell. At this stage, the British accounting 
profession had already begun to react to rising inflation since 1968 (second stage of the inflation 
accounting cycle), and there was now a risk that the proposals of professional bodies would 
crowd out his contribution. In Australia, on the other hand, the delay had also meant that S&O 
had missed the submission deadline for required course material for the upcoming academic year 
(Chambers had made prior arrangements for such usage at the Universities of Sydney and 
Tasmania). The Editor shared these concerns, but offered that there was a considerable upside to 
the delay in the sense that Gower had been given sufficient time to devise an effective marketing 
strategy for S&O that could recoup some of the lost time (#2/09207; #09219).  
The Editor sent Chambers proofs of S&O shortly after its publication. As mentioned earlier, 
because Chambers had resisted most of editorial comments, the composition of the text in S&O 
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had remained largely unchanged through the materialization process from a draft manuscript to a 
printed book. This was so because Chambers had a clear vision of what he was hoping to 
accomplish, and the empirical material he would amass for that purpose, from the time he began 
to write. As an example, even the final length of 243 pages was within the 200–300-page range 
that he had given in correspondence with Penguin Books as early as March 1971. To Chambers’ 
dismay, however, the arrival of the proofs demonstrated that Cheshire had made material 
decisions that had been hereto unbeknown to him (#2/09207; #09219). 
The first decision was in regards to pricing. The plan from the start had always been to 
publish S&O as a paperback, to avoid the ‘turgid feel’ of similar publications and to be able to 
sell it cheaply, perhaps in the two to three-dollar range. This had been one of the reasons that 
Chambers had approached Penguin Books and later Cheshire, as both had a history of publishing 
in this particular format. Instead, Cheshire had opted for a hardback publication with a suggested 
retail price that was four to five times that amount. 
The second decision was in regards to typesetting. Chambers had envisioned ‘running 
headers’ at the top of each page, and he had spent considerable time devising names of chapters 
that he felt had the potential to draw the attention of those readers who might skim through S&O 
while visiting their local bookstore. At the beginning of each chapter, he had also paired the title 
with two to three block-quotes, most of them of a more serious tone. If Cheshire had decided to 
print S&O with ‘running headers’, this would have provided an effective contrast and ensured 
that the reader, who might have arrived at a particular chapter because of its header, was 
presented with some of its key arguments upfront. As an example of this effective use of 
contrast, Chambers matched the beginning of ‘The Loose Rein of the Law’ (ch. two), ‘Will You 
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Walk into My Parlour?’ (ch. ten), and ‘Watchdogs, Bloodhounds, et al.’ (ch. eleven) with 
corresponding block-quotes such as these (presented in order): 
 
The only way that the Legislature should interfere [with the conduct of limited companies] is 
by giving the greatest publicity to the affairs of such companies, that everyone may know on 
what grounds he is dealing. 
/ Robert Lowe, President of [the British] Board of Trade, 1856 / (p. 9). 
 
Shareholders must be put in possession of all the facts necessary for the formation of an 
informed judgment as to the merits or demerits of [a takeover] offer. Such facts must be 
accurately and fairly presented and be available to the shareholder early enough to enable him 
to make a decision in good time. 
/ Rule 14, The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, London, 1968 / (p. 123).10 
 
An Auditor is not bound to be a detective, or … to approach his work with suspicion, or with 
a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is a watchdog, but not a bloodhound. 
/ Lopes L J, Re London & General Bank, 1896 / (p. 144). 
 
DISSEMINATION: FAILURE TO REPEAT EXPOSURE 
 
Gower Press, Distribution, and ED8 
While Chambers remained concerned about the decisions at Cheshire to publish S&O as a 
hardback without running headers, the materialization processes had ended with its (albeit late) 
publication in March 1973. It was now too late to make material changes to the presentation of 
S&O as such, and Gower had taken over the task of distribution. Even so, whereas the timing of 
the publication was now less than ideal, there were still possibilities for widespread distribution 
and dissemination (i.e., what Czarniawska and Joerges [1996] refers to as possibilities for 
repeated exposure). To accomplish this, Gower relied on an extensive mailing list containing 
thousands of potential readers. These readers received regular flyers with promotional abstracts 
of available books and information on how to order copies directly from Cheshire. These 
                                                 
10 We have retained the same quotation format as that which Chambers’ used in S&O. 
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mailshots, in turn, could then also drive up traditional demand, as recipients might still decide to 
purchase through their local bookstore as opposed to placing an order through the mail. As such, 
there were clear economic and operational benefits of this distribution method to Cheshire. The 
publisher could reach potential readers quicker through the mailshots, and, in the process, it 
avoided some of the big discounts demanded by traditional booksellers (#3/09856). 
Chambers had chosen Cheshire as his second option because of their experience with 
publishing books in paperback and their local distribution arm in the UK. Chambers had known 
that Gower was a non-traditional distributor, when he had made this decision, and he too saw 
economic and operational advantages to the mailshots (#3/09856). After the publication of S&O, 
however, he grew increasingly concerned about this distribution method and contacted Trevor 
Barr, Manager at Cheshire, in June 1973. Chambers had then been in contact with his colleagues 
abroad. These colleagues had received no mailshots and, upon contacting their local bookstore, 
had been unable to order S&O, which had led several of them to assume that that it was not for 
distribution outside of Australia (#2/09191).  
In the meantime, the ICAEW’s Accounting Standards Steering Committee (ASSC) had been 
able to issue their first exposure draft on inflation accounting, ED8, for public comment from 
January through June (second stage of the inflation accounting cycle).11 In contrast to the method 
proposed in S&O, which accounted for both specific and general price changes in the 
conventional financial statements, this exposure draft had no discernable empirical basis but had 
nonetheless arrived at the recommendation for the sole use of a price index to adjust for general 
price changes and to provide this information in supplementary statements. 
                                                 
11 The AASC changed its name to the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) in 1976 (Day, 2000). 
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Whereas it was now too late for S&O to influence the comment letters on ED8, Chambers 
submitted his own twelve-page comment letter to the Technical Officer at the ICAEW 
(#2/09044) and published a critical review (1973a) of the exposure draft in The Accountant. He 
also sensed that it was still not too late to raise awareness of his own proposal abroad. His first 
course of action was to send Barr a list of individuals who should receive either free copies of the 
book or the promotional mailshots. To maximize exposure, the recipients of the free book 
included nine British journals and several prominent individuals such as Christopher Marley, 
Louis Loss, and John (“Sandy”) Burton. Marley was the Financial Editor at The Times in London 
and had co-authored an influential book on accounting reform together with Edward Stamp 
(1970). Loss was an expert in corporate law at Harvard University, who was visiting the 
Attorney General’s Office, in Canberra, to advise on new securities laws in Australia. Burton 
was the Chief Accountant at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US 
(#2/09191; #09193; #3/09856). The recipients of the mailshots, on the other hand, are more 
numerous and included some 400 academics in the fields of accounting, finance, and law 
(Chambers had met several of these individuals during his trip abroad in 1959). 
Chambers’ second course of action was to send review copies of S&O to the American 
Accounting Association (AAA) and the Australian Society of Accountants (ASA) for 
consideration for their respective accounting literature awards. As for the British equivalent of 
these organizations, the Association of University Teachers of Accounting (the predecessor to 
the British Accounting and Finance Association), it offered no such awards at the time and 
therefore did not receive a review copy (for more about this organization, see Maunders, 1997; 
Parker, 1997; Zeff, 1997). Unfortunately, the American award required a nomination from 
someone that was serving on the organization’s award committee. Chambers managed to secure 
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such a nomination from a colleague at the University of Tasmania, but not in time for the 1973 
submission deadline (#2/09191; #09193; #09195; #09196). The AAA therefore considered S&O 
the following year but it did not grant the publication an award (incidentally, AE&EB had in fact 
won the inaugural award in 1966). 
 
Poor Sales, Promotional Efforts, and SSAP7 
Barr responded to Chambers’ requests in July 1973. He admitted that the initial performance of 
S&O abroad had been poor. There had been just over 100 books sold in the UK and another 100 
elsewhere. To improve the situation, he had taken Chambers’ advice and now arranged to send 
free copies of S&O and promotional mailshots to the specified individuals and organizations. He 
had also notified Roger Searle, the Marketing Manager, who had undertaken a series of 
promotional efforts to increase awareness of the availability of S&O. As a result, there is 
evidence that subsequent sales somewhat increased (about 1,000 books had been sold by 
October), but Chambers was still unsatisfied with the poor performance and grew increasingly 
suspicious whether his promotional directions had been carried out. He therefore contacted his 
colleagues abroad, again, regarding availability, and, according to them, the situation had 
remained the same. None of them had seen any promotional efforts, received any mailshots, or 
found S&O for sale in their local bookstores (#1/04304; #04337; #2/09194; #09203; #09204; 
#09205; #09206). 
Chambers contacted Barney Rivers, the Managing Director of Cheshire, with these findings in 
May 1974. The ASSC had issued their provisional standard on inflation accounting, SSAP7, the 
same month (second stage of the inflation accounting cycle). ED8 and the input solicited during 
the public comment period the previous year served as a basis for this provisional standard, and 
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there is no mention of Chambers’ critical 1973 article, his S&O, or that the committee ever 
considered the use of current exit prices to adjust for specific price changes. Instead, similar to 
the previous exposure draft, the provisional standard glossed over Chambers’ specific price ideas 
and advocated the use of a price index to account for general price changes and to publish these 
accounts in supplementary financial statements. Furthermore, with the release of the provisional 
standard, the ASSC now urged for immediate adoption and the ICAEW published a two-volume 
working guide on how to prepare accounts in accordance with their proposal (#2/09207)  . 
In his correspondence with Rivers, Chambers noted that the situation was now dire. None of 
the individuals on his list of mailshots had received promotional material, none of the nine 
British journals had reviewed the book, and none of his colleagues abroad could find S&O in 
their local bookstores. Chambers felt that the various delays in the production, distribution, and 
promotion of S&O had prevented him to contribute to the British inflation accounting debate in a 
meaningful way. He characterized S&O as ‘polemic’ (i.e. what Mumford [1979] described as a 
radical study of accounting techniques in the fourth stage of the inflation accounting cycle), and 
the failure to disseminate it widely had ‘irrevocably’ damaged its prospects for adoption 
(#2/09207). The result was that Chambers found himself again responding to the proposals of 
others, as opposed to leading the discussion with S&O. As an example of this, Chambers 
prepared a ‘refresher course’ on inflation accounting for members of the ASA around this time 
(#2/09166; #09277). The basis for this course was an extended critique of ED8 and SSAP7, 
perhaps in a preemptive move in fear that the Australian profession was inclined to follow the 
lead of their British counterpart. 
In order to change the course of the inflation accounting debate, Chambers reiterated his 
initial request to have S&O published as a cheaper paperback with ‘running headers’. This rerun 
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could coincide with the upcoming announcement in June 1974 that S&O had won the ASA 
literature award. Without such a republishing, his feelings were now that it would have been far 
more beneficial to spread his findings over several journal articles instead of concentrating them 
into S&O. This is an approach that Chambers had tried a few years earlier with a series of review 
articles of different methods of accounting published in the British practitioner journal The 
Accountant (1970f; 1970e; 1970d; 1970c; 1970b; 1970a). The R. J. Chambers Archive, however, 
reveals that he did not receive any response or feedback from these publication (for the available 
correspondence, see #2/08957; #8958; #8959; #8960; #8961; #8962; #8963). 
Rivers did not respond to this request until September. As a compromise, he was willing to 
lower the price of the hardback version of S&O, but his ‘market research’ had given no 
indication that there was demand for an even cheaper paperback version. In fact, Gower’s 
distribution method tended to generate sales around 1,500 copies for similar manuscripts, and he 
felt confident that sales of S&O would build up to that amount in due time (#2/09207; #09208; 
#2/09209; #09210; #09211; #09212). 
In his reply, Chambers expressed disappointment with the compromise and requested for the 
provision of evidence that the marketing manager had carried out the agreed promotional efforts 
(e.g., receipts from the editors of the nine British journals that had decided against reviewing 
S&O). Chambers felt that lowering the price of the hardback version of S&O was undesirable for 
at least two reasons, and he suspected that the suggestion was not a compromise but a desire to 
‘flog’ the remaining inventory and ‘milk potential readers for all their worth’. First, the readers 
that had already purchased S&O would have felt cheated. Second, the timing of a price reduction 
immediately after the ASA literature award would ‘cheapen’ S&O in the minds of potential new 
readers. In essence, such an action would communicate to those readers that the content of S&O 
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was not worth the money, even after a recognition in the literature. For the British market, 
however, Chambers agreed that a ‘generous currency conversion’ could disguise a small price 
reduction (#2/09213). 
 
Internal investigation and the Sandilands Committee 
Chambers’ request for evidence regarding the marketing activities for S&O went unanswered for 
several months. When Rivers eventually arranged for a meeting at Cheshire’s office in 
Melbourne in 1975 (#3/09856), the British government had already intervened in the inflation 
accounting debate (third stage of the inflation accounting cycle). Parliament had established an 
independent inflation accounting committee in January 1974 (hereafter the Sandilands 
Committee), and it had tasked the committee with recommending potential reforms to financial 
reporting practices in the country (for an in-depth analysis of these events, see Robson, 1988). 
Francis Sandilands, a successful industrialist and Chairman of Delta Metal Company, headed up 
the committee. Joining him were ten individuals from practice and industry and an economist 
from the London Graduate School of Business (later the London Business School). As such, it is 
noteworthy that none of its members came from accounting academia or had any experience 
whatsoever with inflation accounting methods (Sandilands Committee, 1975). 
The Sandilands Committee held regular public hearings until June 1975. Several of these 
hearings were all-day sessions, and the committee collected a considerable amount of empirical 
material during this time. The committee solicited public comments from advertisements in local 
journals and from reaching out to organizations and individuals directly. In addition to these 
comments, Coopers and Lybrand surveyed 242 British companies about their experience with 
inflation accounting and their opinions about the methods available. Some of the committee’s 
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members also visited the SEC and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. As a result of 
these activities, the committee received just over 300 comments (Sandilands Committee, 1975). 
One of these had been from Chambers. Still waiting for his meeting with Cheshire, Chambers 
had read the solicitation for comments in The Accountant’s Magazine, which was a Scottish 
practitioner journal. Wary about the availability of S&O in the UK, he had submitted the entire 
book together with a sixty-page write-up for the committee’s consideration (#2/09265).12 
The Sandilands Committee issued their report in September 1975. Chambers received a copy 
together with a personal note from the secretary.13 This note expressed regret that the committee 
had not been able to devote much space in their report to S&O (#2/09265). Despite the amassing 
of empirical material that covered more companies and a longer time-span than that which the 
committee had solicited during their comment period (appendix two), only three pages in the 
final 374-page report addressed S&O. In these three pages, the committee did not engage with 
the empirical evidence presented in S&O but nonetheless dismissed the proposal to account for 
specific and general price changes as an unrealistic academic exercise that had little feasibility 
for adoption. In contrast, the committee offered a detailed four-chapter rejection of ED8 and 
SSAP7 and it settled on the notion of ‘value to the owner’ which was championed by the local 
‘LSE Triumvirate’ of David Solomons, Harold Edey, and William Baxter (for more about their 
influence, see Whittington, 1994). As such, we argue that this relatively easy dismissal was 
possible precisely because S&O was not readily available to the public (i.e., it failed to ‘touch 
down’ often enough in the consciousness of the debate participants). 
                                                 
12 Chambers would later make a similar submission to the Mathews Committee in Australia in 1975 (#2/09330). 
13 It is important to mention that the secretary, Chris Westwick, was an accounting graduate from the London School 
of Economics and likely committed to the notion of ‘value to the owner’. 
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It is against this background that Chambers had arrived for his meeting with Rivers at 
Cheshire’s office in Melbourne. During this meeting, it became clear that the request for 
evidence of marketing activities for S&O had stalled because the person responsible, Searle, was 
no longer working for the publisher. Given this, Rivers promised to reevaluate the potential for 
additional marketing activities and he assigned Bruce Allardice, the Australian Sales Manager, to 
track down Searle’s whereabouts, to request information directly from Gower, and to conduct 
additional market research on whether there was a demand for a cheaper paperback edition of 
S&O (#3/09856). 
Allardice tracked down Searle, who insisted that he had carried out the marketing activities 
despite being unable to produce any proof from the recipients of S&O or the mailshot. He had 
also been in contact with Gower. The distributor had received an initial shipment of 24 copies in 
July 1973 and an additional 55 copies since then. During this time, sales had exceeded their 
inventory and there was an outstanding order for 32 additional copies. This order, however, was 
several months overdue, which had led the distributor to assume that S&O was out of print. Upon 
learning this, Allardice, who did not believe that Searle had carried out any marketing activities, 
sent out review copies to the journals and mailshots to the academics that Chambers had 
previously specified. He also fulfilled Gower’s outstanding order for 32 additional copies of 
S&O (#3/09856). 
 
ICRA, Longman, and ED18 
Chambers did not hear from Cheshire for the next several months. Instead, Edward Stamp 
contacted him in March 1976. Stamp was then a Professor in Accounting at Lancaster University 
and the head of the International Centre for Research in Accounting (ICRA), which he had 
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established some years earlier as an independent research group (for more about Stamp, see 
Mumford, 1994). Chambers had become acquainted with Stamp when the latter was a Senior 
Lecturer in Accounting at Victoria University, Wellington, in the 1960s (#1/08217; #08218; 
#08219). Both shared an interest in financial reporting reforms, and the two had begun 
corresponding over a critical article that Stamp had written on the financial scandal at the 
conglomerate Reid Murray Holdings (this case was later included in S&O). 
Sensing that the Sandilands Committee had snubbed S&O in their report, Stamp offered to 
publish a critique of the report if Chambers was willing to write such a critique. Chambers, who 
was no clearer on the extent of the actual distribution of S&O abroad, accepted the offer. ICRA 
published his monograph, Current Cost Accounting - A Critique of the Sandilands Report, in 
June and sent copies to journals, universities, and individuals, including all the members of the 
committee (#2/09427). In the monograph, Chambers disagreed with the committee’s 
recommendation to use an accounting method based on the concept of ‘value to the owner’ and 
current entry prices (for similar proposals, see Solomons, 1961; Baxter, 1967; Wright, 1971). 
Chambers’ next move came after he had received a circular from Bill Kerr, the new Managing 
Director at Cheshire, in July 1976. The circular announced that Longman Australia, a subsidiary 
of Longman Penguin, had acquired the shareholdings of Cheshire. The new entity, Longman 
Cheshire, had arranged for half of Cheshire’s staff to transfer to their new office building across 
the street from the old one in Melbourne. The remaining half, including all the individuals that 
had been involved in the publishing of S&O, faced redundancy (#3/09856). 
Chambers saw the upheaval and change of management at Cheshire as an opportunity to 
salvage what was possible from his situation. He reached out to Kerr, describing his struggles 
with the publisher since signing over the publishing and distribution rights to S&O in 1971. 
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Throughout this period, Chambers had found it impossible to communicate with those 
responsible and all his contacts had now either left or been made redundant in the acquisition. He 
felt that S&O had fallen victim to deceits, lies, and an experimental distribution model that had 
proved unsuccessful. The result was that S&O could not have the kind of impact on the British 
inflation accounting debate for which he had hoped. It was now late in the debate, and public 
opinion had all but solidified around alternative methods to account for changes in specific and 
general price-levels (#3/09856). 
Whereas nothing could change what had transpired, Chambers now requested that Kerr would 
allow him to purchase the remaining copies of S&O as a sign of goodwill. This would allow him 
to disseminate the remaining copies as widely as possible and relieve the publisher of trying to 
flog a three-year-old book. Kerr apologized for what had happened to S&O, and he was glad to 
sell the remaining inventory for a nominal fee. As such, Chambers acquired the remaining 1,065 
copies of S&O and proceeded to distribute them to all four hundred recipients of the earlier 
mailshot (#3/09856).14 
Unfortunately, Chambers had been right in his earlier assertion that S&O would arrive too late 
to have a substantive impact on the British inflation accounting debate (see appendix one). 
Chambers’ repossession and distribution of S&O coincided with the ASC’s issuance of ED18 in 
November 1976. This exposure draft marked the last of the radical studies of accounting 
techniques (the fourth stage of the inflation accounting cycle). After some continued controversy 
in the profession (stage five), a compromise recommendation was reached with the issuance of 
another provisional standard, SSAP16, in March 1980 (stage six). Falling inflation rates had 
already foreshadowed this standard (stage seven), and interest in reform had subsequently 
                                                 
14 Securities and Obscurities was later republished by Sydney University Press in the 2000s, as part of the Sydney 
Accounting Classics Series (for more about this, see https://sydney.edu.au/sup/books/accounting/). 
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dwindled (stage eight). The result was that SSAP16 eventually failed and the ASC announced 





Our objective for this study has to examine the contribution of Raymond J. Chambers to the 
British inflation accounting debate in the early-to-mid 1970s, from the perspective of  the 
reception of his book, Securities and Obscurities: A Case for Reform of the Law of Company 
Accounts, published in 1973. Whereas both Chambers (e.g., Wells, 2000; Clarke, et al., 2010; 
Edwards, et al., 2013) and the problems of inflation (e.g., Chordia and Shivakumar, 2005; 
Konchitchki, 2011; Kiechle and Lampenius, 2012) continue to receive considerable attention in 
the literature, our empirical narrative departs from this research in its focus on the environmental 
and material conditions in which ideas are formulated and communicated.  
The first section summarized the case presented in S&O for the reform of ‘company 
accounts’. The second section stepped back and considered the labor that Chambers had to 
undertake to transform this case into published form (i.e. S&O). The third section traced how ill-
advised choices in the materialization process led to a delay and eventual failure to disseminate 
S&O sufficiently during the British inflation accounting debate. Our general observation is that 
groups and individuals participating in the inflation accounting debate were able to brush S&O 
aside because it arrived too late in the debate to warrant serious consideration. It is important to 
note, however, that it remains an empirical question as to the extent this particular narrative can 
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inform us about the trajectory of competing accounting methods in the 1970s or during other 
periods of inflation. 
To structure our empirical narrative, we employed  Czarniawska and Joerges’ (1996) notion 
of the ‘travel of ideas’ and Mumford’s (1979) observation of the existence of ‘inflation 
accounting debate cycles’ as an analytical framework. Thus, the narrative refrains from 
evaluating the merits of various inflation accounting methods and revisiting past debates; 
instead, we trace the material circumstances surrounding a specific contribution to these debates. 
In so doing, we contribute to the emerging literature on the practicalities of knowledge 
production in accounting (e.g., Qu, et al., 2010; Persson, 2013; Persson and Napier, 2014). And, 
whereas this study is about a specific period and setting, the findings resonate with emerging 
evidence that environmental and material circumstances can be just as (or more) important than 
the merits of particular ‘accounting ideas’. Contemporary research has found this to be the case 
when it comes to barriers faced by non-native English accounting researchers (e.g., Lukka and 
Kasanen, 1993; Carmona, et al., 1999; Raffournier and Schatt, 2010), shifts in accounting trends 
(e.g., Clarke, 1980; Whitley, 1986; Dean and Clarke, 2010), and the adoption of management 
accounting innovations (e.g., Free and Qu, 2011; Qu and Cooper, 2011; Free and Qu, 2012). Our 
central argument is therefore that it is fruitful for researchers to consider the effects that 
circumstantial conditions have on ‘accounting ideas’ of all kinds. 
Summing up, it is somewhat ironic that Chambers himself sensed this overreliance on ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ ideas, as well as an unsupported reverence for those ideas that had ‘sustained’ through 
time, as early as ten years before the publication of S&O in 1973. In a heated exchange about the 
merits of historical cost accounting with Robert N. Anthony, then a prominent Professor of 
Accounting at Harvard University, Chambers wrote: 
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I make the bold proposition that the existence of practices proves nothing except that they are 
the practices of a people at a time and place … There was a time before the number zero was 
invented; was its adoption a mistake? Clearly for centuries, if not millennia, people got along 
without it; their practices were quite “useful” to them. I could multiply this type of illustration 
manyfold. But it would only serve to point out two things (a) that the existence of any practice 
is only a function of knowledge and belief and (b) that the people for whose “benefit” 
practices exist are seldom able to decide what is best for their purposes either because they act 
in ignorance of alternatives or because they are in the hands of “experts”. I am not in the least 
on shaky ground; the whole of human history is studded with examples of well-established 
practices which have been demonstrated to be useless at best and positively inhuman at worst. 
The only retort possible to this is that the present age is so enlightened that we could not 
possibly make similar mistakes. And of course this has been the same conceit that men 
generally in every era have had of their own era. It has only been the really expert men who 
have not been deluded by this belief (#2/08481). 
 
As such, perhaps Chambers’ own words provide a lesson for him—he needed to be better at 





Appendix 1: British Inflation and Corresponding Events 1967-1978* 
 
Year Inflation§ Event 
1967 2.5%  
1968 4.7% Increase in domestic inflation (stage one of the inflation accounting debate cycle)† 
1969 5.4%  
1970 6.4%  
1971 9.4% Chambers begins pursuing publishers for S&O 
1972 7.1% Chambers completes the manuscript for S&O 
1973 9.2% Cheshire publishes S&O, and ASSC issues ED8. Only the latter readily available. 
1974 16.0% 
Chambers contacts Cheshire Publishing regarding distribution concerns, and ASC issues 
SSAP7. 
1975 24.2% 
Cheshire Publishing conducts an internal investigation, and the Sandilands Committee issues 
their report. 
1976 16.5% 
Chambers acquires the remaining stock of S&O for a nominal fee and begins to distribute the 
book on his own, and ASC issues ED18.† 
1977 15.8%  
1978 8.3% 
Falling inflation rates (stage seven) and interest in inflation accounting reform dwindles 
(stage eight) 
 
* The source for the inflation data comes from the Consumer Price Inflation Time Series Dataset, retrieved from the 
homepage of the UK Office for National Statistics (www.ons.gov.uk). 
§ The measure of inflation used here is the percentage change of all items in the consumer price index over 12 
months, using 1987 as the base year. This particular measurement is one of few time series in the Consumer Price 
Inflation Time Series Dataset that covers the 1960-1970s period. 
† Because Mumford’s (1979) ‘inflation accounting debate cycles’ often overlap in time, we have focused the entries 
in the timeline to the ‘window of opportunity’ between the first and sixth stage described in the ‘analytical 
framework’ section. As such, ED18 marked the last radical study of accounting techniques before the publication of 
the compromise recommendation, SSAP16, in 1980. 
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Year* R#§ Company† 
1972 2 Rocla Industries (AU) 
1971 1 Aberfoyle (AU) 
1971 1 AU & Kandos Cement Holdings (AU) 
1971 1 Carlton & United Breweries (AU) 
1971 1 Chrysler Corp. (USA) 
1971 2 Cunard Steam-ship Co. (UK) 
1971 1 Davy-Ashmore (UK) 
1971 1 E. Z. Industries (AU) 
1971 2 Great Boulder Mines (AU) 
1971 1 Midland-Yorkshire Tar Distillers (UK) 
1971 1 Mineral Securities Australia (AU) 
1971 1 Occidental Petroleum (USA) 
1970 1 American Home products (USA) 
1970 1 American Smelting & Refining (USA) 
1970 1 Bank of New South Wales (AU) 
1970 1 Barclays Bank (UK) 
1970 1 Boeing Co. (USA) 
1970 2 Brooke Bond & Liebig (UK) 
1970 1 Burns Philp (AU) 
1970 1 Debenhams (UK) 
1970 1 Duple Motor Bodies (UK) 
1970 1 Eliza Tinsley Holdings (AU) 
1970 1 General Motors Corp. (USA) 
1970 1 Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds (UK) 
1970 1 Hothlyn Corp. (AU) 
1970 1 Jardine Matheson (AU) 
1970 2 John McIlwraith Industries (AU) 
1970 1 Lend Lease Corp. (AU) 
1970 1 Libbey-Owens-Ford (USA) 
1970 1 Lloyds Bank (UK) 
1970 1 Lockheed Aircraft (USA) 
1970 2 Metal Box Co. (UK) 
1970 1 Midland Bank (UK) 
1970 2 Mutual Life & Citizens Assurance (AU) 
1970 1 National & Commercial Bank (UK) 
1970 1 National Westminster Bank (UK) 
1970 1 Nestle Alimentana (CH) 
 
Year R# Company 
1970 2 North Broken Hill (AU) 
1970 1 Pacific Acceptance Corp. (AU) 
1970 1 Penn Central Transportation (USA) 
1970 1 Phillips Petroleum (USA) 
1970 1 Press Caps (UK) 
1970 1 Royal Dutch Shell (UK) 
1970 1 S. Hoffnung & Co. (UK) 
1970 1 Standard Oil Co. (USA) 
1970 1 Windsor Hotels (AU) 
1969 1 Allied Suppliers (UK) 
1969 1 Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing (USA) 
1969 1 AMK Corp. (USA) 
1969 1 Associated Biscuit Manufacturers (UK) 
1969 1 Associated Electrical Industries (UK) 
1969 1 Atlantic Acceptance Corp. (CA) 
1969 1 Australian Mutual Provident Soc. (AU) 
1969 2 B. F. Goodrich (USA) 
1969 1 Bath & Portland Group (UK) 
1969 1 Bethlehem Steel (USA) 
1969 1 British Insulated Cables (UK) 
1969 1 British Mortgage & Trust (CA) 
1969 1 Cadbury & Schweppes (UK) 
1969 1 City Mutual Life Assurance Soc. (AU) 
1969 1 Col. Mutual Life Assurance Soc. (AU) 
1969 2 Continental Vending Machine (USA) 
1969 1 Copperweld Steel (USA) 
1969 1 Dennis Brothers (UK) 
1969 1 Federated Industries (AU) 
1969 1 General Electric Co. (UK) 
1969 1 George Wimpey (UK) 
1969 1 Grosset & Dunlap (USA) 
1969 1 Gulf & Western Industries (USA) 
1969 1 Hay's Wharf (UK) 
1969 1 Imperial Chemical Industries of AU&NZ 
1969 2 J. Lyons & Co. (UK) 
1969 1 Jute Industries Holdings (UK) 
1969 1 Klinger Manufacturing (UK) 
 
Year R# Company 
1969 1 Leasco Data Processing Eq. Corp. (UK) 
1969 1 Ling-Temco-Vought (USA) 
1969 1 Mark Foys (AU) 
1969 2 McDowells (AU) 
1969 2 Myer Emporium (AU) 
1969 1 National General Corp. (USA) 
1969 1 Norvic Shoe Co. (UK) 
1969 1 Pergamon Press (UK) 
1969 1 Tecalemit (UK) 
1969 1 Thomas Robinson & Son (UK) 
1969 1 Trans World Airlines (USA) 
1969 1 W. R. Grace & Co. (USA) 
1969 3 Westec Corp. (USA) 
1969 1 Weyburn Engineering (UK) 
1968 1 Allegheny Ludlum Steel (USA) 
1968 1 American Book Co. (USA) 
1968 1 Australian Paper Manufacturers (AU) 
1968 1 Babcock & Wilcox (UK) 
1968 4 BarChris Construction Corp. (USA) 
1968 1 BPB Industries (UK) 
1968 1 Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (AU) 
1968 1 Gamble Skogmo (USA) 
1968 1 General Outdoor Advertising (USA) 
1968 2 J. Hepworth & Son (UK) 
1968 1 Jefferson Electric Co. (USA) 
1968 1 Lake & Elliot (UK) 
1968 1 Law Research Service (USA) 
1968 1 Litton Industries (USA) 
1968 1 Martins Bank (UK) 
1968 1 Mr Whippy Holdings (AU) 
1968 1 Newall Machine Tool (UK) 
1968 1 Norcros (UK) 
1968 1 Reed Paper (UK) 
1968 1 Rowntree Mackintosh (UK) 
1968 1 Western Mining Corp. (AU) 
1968 1 Westinghouse Electric (USA) 
1967 1 Aberdare Holdings (UK) 
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Year R# Company 
1967 1 American Seating Co. (USA) 
1967 1 Armco Steel Corp. (USA) 
1967 1 Beech-Nut Life Savers (USA) 
1967 1 Dana Corp. (USA) 
1967 1 Diamond International Corp. (USA) 
1967 1 Divco-Wayne Corp. (USA) 
1967 1 Endicott Johnson Corp. (USA) 
1967 1 Eversharp (USA) 
1967 1 General Cigar Co. (USA) 
1967 1 Handley Page (UK) 
1967 1 Hoover (UK) 
1967 1 Ideal Cement Co. (USA) 
1967 1 International Distillers & Vintners (UK) 
1967 1 International Paper Co. (USA) 
1967 1 International Tele. & Telegraph (USA) 
1967 1 Lily-Tulip Cup (USA) 
1967 1 Metal Industries (AU) 
1967 1 Metro-Goldwyn Mayer (USA) 
1967 1 Mick Simmons Holdings (AU) 
1967 1 National Biscuit Co. (USA) 
1967 1 Owens-Illinois (USA) 
1967 1 Riegel Paper (USA) 
1967 1 Showerings (UK) 
1967 1 St. Regis Paper Co. (USA) 
1967 2 Stock Conversion (UK) 
1967 1 Thorn Electrical Industries (UK) 
1967 2 Trafalgar House Investments (UK) 
1967 1 Twentieth Century Fox (USA) 
1967 1 West Virginia Paper & Pulp (USA) 
1967 1 Weyerhaeuser Co. (USA) 
1967 1 Youngstown Steel & Tube (USA) 
1966 1 Anthony Hordern & Sons (AU) 
1966 1 Brunswick International (AU) 
1966 1 Cartons & Corrugated Papers (AU) 
1966 2 Coal & Allied Industries (AU) 
1966 1 E. S. Lazarus & Co. (AU) 
1966 1 J. R. Geigy (CH) 
 
Year R# Company 
1966 1 Lewis' Investment Trust (UK) 
1966 1 Marcus Clark (AU) 
1966 1 Smiths Industries (UK) 
1966 1 Wheeling Steel (USA) 
1965 1 Allied Crude Veg. Oil Refining (USA) 
1965 1 American Express Co. (USA) 
1965 1 American Express Warehousing (USA) 
1965 3 Associated Engineering (UK) 
1965 1 G & R Wills Holdings (AU) 
1965 1 George Cohen 600 Group (UK) 
1965 1 Payne's Properties (AU) 
1965 1 Softwoods Holdings (AU) 
1964 1 Associated Television (UK) 
1964 1 Carroll Musgrove Theatres (AU) 
1964 3 Chevron Sydney (AU) 
1964 1 Commonwealth Industrial Gases (AU) 
1964 1 Gestetner Holdings (UK) 
1964 2 Henry Jones Cooperative (AU) 
1964 1 Manders Holdings (UK) 
1964 1 Marks & Spencer (UK) 
1964 1 Montgomery Ward (USA) 
1964 2 Ready Mixed Concrete (AU) 
1964 1 Sydney Guarantee Corp. (AU) 
1963 1 Adelaide Chemical (AU) 
1963 1 Brisbane Theatres (AU) 
1963 1 Cuming Smith (AU) 
1963 1 F. W. Woolworth & Co (UK) 
1963 1 Garrison Industries (AU) 
1963 3 Hedley Byrne & Co. (UK) 
1963 1 Marra Developments (AU) 
1963 1 Mount Isa Mines (AU) 
1963 1 Reece Corp. (USA) 
1963 1 Reid Murray Developments (AU) 
1963 4 Reid Murray Holdings (AU) 
1963 1 Squatting Investments (AU) 
1963 2 Texas Gulf Sulphur (USA) 
1963 1 Union Carbide & Carbon (USA) 
 
Year R# Company 
1963 1 Wallaroo-Mount Lyell Fertilisers (AU) 
1963 3 Yale Express System (USA) 
1962 2 Australia Hotel (AU) 
1962 1 Australian United Investment (AU) 
1962 1 Bishop Oil & Co. (USA) 
1962 1 Castlemaine Perkins (AU) 
1962 2 James Stedman (AU) 
1962 2 John Brown & Co. (UK) 
1962 1 Kaiser Industries (USA) 
1962 1 Latec Investments (AU) 
1961 1 Brick Industries (AU) 
1961 1 Brisbane Permanent Build. & Bank (AU) 
1961 2 British Motor Corp. (UK) 
1961 1 Cessna Co. (USA) 
1961 1 Globe Telegraph & Trust (UK) 
1961 1 Greater Union Theatres (AU) 
1961 1 Howard Smith (AU) 
1961 2 Imperial Chemical Industries (UK) 
1961 1 International Match (USA) 
1961 2 Investment Registry (UK) 
1961 4 J. Sears & Co. (UK) 
1961 1 Kreuger & Toll (USA) 
1961 1 Lee, Higginson & Co. (USA) 
1961 1 Mather & Platt (UK) 
1961 1 Melbourne Steamship (AU) 
1961 2 Montague Burton (UK) 
1961 1 Wiggins Teape (UK) 
1960 1 Assoc. Portland & Cement Mfr. (UK) 
1960 1 Beale & Co. (AU) 
1960 1 Electric & Musical Industries (UK) 
1960 1 G. E. Crane Holdings (AU) 
1960 1 John Martin & Co. (AU) 
1960 1 Ralph Symonds (AU) 
1959 1 Adelaide Steamship (AU) 
1959 1 British Home Stores (UK) 
1959 4 Fisons (UK) 
1959 1 H. C. Sleigh (AU) 
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Year R# Company 
1959 1 Masonite (AU) 
1959 2 Rolls Royce (UK) 
1959 1 Watney Mann (UK) 
1958 1 Aluminium Co. of America (USA) 
1958 1 Boots Pure Drug Co. (UK) 
1958 1 British Aluminium (UK) 
1958 1 John Connell (AU) 
1958 2 Reynolds Metals (USA) 
1958 1 Tube Investments (UK) 
1957 1 R. J. Reynolds Tobacco (USA) 
1956 1 British Cocoa & Chocolate (UK) 
1956 1 London Stores (AU) 
1956 1 Scottish Motor Traction (UK) 
1956 1 Sears Holdings (UK) 
1955 1 Birmingham Post & Mail (UK) 
1955 1 Borax Consolidated (UK) 
1955 2 City Equitable Fire Insurance (UK) 
1955 1 Ellis & Co. (UK) 
1955 1 Finney Isles (AU) 
 
Year R# Company 
1955 1 G. J. Coles (AU) 
1955 1 Griffin Coal Mining Co. (AU) 
1955 1 Liberator Perm. Benefit Build. Soc. (UK) 
1955 1 London & Globe Co. (UK) 
1955 1 Manton & Sons (AU) 
1954 1 Buckley & Nunn (AU) 
1954 1 Charles Birks (AU) 
1954 1 David Jones (AU) 
1954 2 Great Universal Stores (UK) 
1954 1 Hotel Metropole (AU) 
1954 4 Jones & Higgins (UK) 
1953 4 Binns of Sunderland (UK) 
1953 1 P & O Steam Navogiation Co. (UK) 
1953 1 Savoy Hotels (UK) 
1952 3 Broken Hill Proprietary Co. (AU) 
1952 4 House of Fraser (UK) 
1952 4 Scottish Drapery Corp. (UK) 
1952 1 Shell Transport & Trading (UK) 
1951 1 Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. (USA) 
 
Year R# Company 
1951 1 Ballarat Brewing (AU) 
1951 1 Henry B. Smith (AU) 
1951 1 Patons & Baldwins (UK) 
1951 1 Transamerica Corp. (USA) 
1950 2 Colonial Sugar Refining (AU) 
1949 2 Diamond T. Motor Co. (USA) 
1949 2 Equitable Office Building (USA) 
1949 2 National Steel Corp. (USA) 
1948 3 Courtaulds (UK) 
1948 1 General Aniline & Film (USA) 
1947 2 United States Steel (USA) 
1940 1 McKesson & Robbins (USA) 
1931 1 Ultramares Corp. (USA) 
1911 1 Brazilian Rubber Plant. & Estate (UK) 
1895 2 London & General Bank (UK) 
NG‡ 1 Imperial Tobacco Co. of Canada (CA) 
NG 1 Mill Factors (USA) 
NG 1 Philip's Gloeilampenfabrieken (NL) 
   
 
 
* The year refers to the date of the material reviewed in the preparation of Securities and Obscurities (1973). On the occasions where two or more sources are 
reviewed, the year indicates the date of the earliest source. The earliest source is a British legal case from 1895. 
§ ‘#R’ refers to the number of references to a particular company. This information was retrieved from the ‘Index of Companies’ in Securities and Obscurities 
(1973). There are 348 references in total. 142 (41%) references are to companies in the United Kingdom; 108 (31%) to companies in the United States; and 98 
(28%) to companies in Australia. 
† The companies were retrieved from the ‘Index of Companies’ in Securities and Obscurities (1973). There are 278 companies in total. 101 (36.5%) companies 
are from the United Kingdom; 88 (31%) from Australia; and 83 (30%) from the United States. There are also two companies from Switzerland (CH), one from 
Canada (CA), and one from the Netherlands (NL). 
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